International media outlets have suggested that the rising tensions between China and the US have made Taiwan’s 2024 presidential and legislative election increasingly fraught. Yet, a review of the 2020 and 2024 election legislative bulletins released by the Taiwanese Central Election Commission (CEC) indicate that the two main political camps in Taiwan are seeking to de-escalate their campaign rhetoric.

There has been a lot of attention on the presidential candidates’ viewpoints on cross-strait relations. However, the legislative elections are equally important for Taiwan’s relationship with China, because Taiwan’s legislators have the power to propose and approve crucial national defense policies. A review of the political viewpoints of the legislative candidates provides a glimpse of Taiwan’s future cross-strait policies.

Note: The so-called ‘pan-green camp’ consists of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and affiliated parties: Formosa Alliance, New Power Party, Taiwan Action Party Alliance, and the Taiwan Statebuilding Party. The pan-green camp generally favors Taiwanese independence and distance from China. On the other end, the ‘pan-blue camp’ is composed of the Kuomintang (KMT), New Party, and the People First Party. Pan-blue supports friendlier relations with mainland China.

From the data we have collected, we have concluded that the prospects of war might have forced candidates to change their approach to the ‘China factor’. 

Figure 1 shows that the pan-green camp, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and pro-independence parties have drastically toned down their stance on China. The percentage of pan-green candidates who openly endorse Taiwan’s independence has fallen from 12.62% in 2020 to just 4.05% in 2024. Similarly, open opposition towards China and wider calls for defending Taiwan or its democracy have also dropped significantly. 

Figure 1:

A possible reason for the decreased emphasis on independence and opposition to China is that the 2024 elections are being framed as a choice between war and peace by the Kuomintang (KMT), the leading party of the pan-blue camp.

In recent months, the KMT has intensified the narrative that a DPP-led Taiwan will end in an armed conflict with China. The KMT has adopted a ‘prevent war’ strategy, employing slogans such as ‘Cross-Strait Peace, Not War’, ‘Oppose Sending Youths to the Battlefield’, and ‘Voting for the DPP Equals War’. Figure 2 illustrates that the percentage of pan-blue candidates advocating for war prevention rose from 3.7% in 2020 to 10.77% this year. Fang-Yu Chen, an assistant professor of political science at Soochow University, Taiwan, noted that the KMT has started adopting this strategy since the local elections in 2022, and have learned that it resonates well with voters. It appears the strategy has been so effective that the DPP has had to tone down its anti-China rhetoric to avoid scaring possible voters, said professor Chen. 

Figure 2:

The shift towards a more war-oriented narrative can be attributed to a combination of the deteriorating global security environment and Chinese propaganda efforts, state both professor Chen and Jaw-Nian Huang, an associate professor at the Graduate Institute of Development Studies, National Chengchi University, Taiwan. The wars in Ukraine and Gaza have made the prospect of armed conflict all the more realistic, and these fears have been further exacerbated by Chinese propaganda. Chinese officials have frequently framed the Taiwanese elections as a choice between war and peace, Reuters reported earlier this month.

There are more forces that may explain pan-green’s softer approach in the upcoming elections. DPP candidate William Lai has also faced pressure from the US government to not escalate tensions with China. Taiwan plays an important role in China-US relations and the US government hopes that any future Taiwanese president will maintain some degree of ‘predictability’, noted Jie-min Wu, a research fellow of Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica.

In addition, Reuters reported that both opposition members and Chinese government officials have frequently criticized Mr. Lai for some of his earlier statements about Taiwanese independence, often accusing him of being a dangerous ‘independence worker’.

The shift in focus to this war-oriented framework also means that previously significant agendas such as independence/unification and democracy/authoritarianism have become less relevant, says Jaw-Nian Huang, an associate professor at the Graduate Institute of Development Studies, National Chengchi University, Taiwan. Hong Kong played a prominent role in the previous 2020 elections, with over 17 candidates expressing their support for the city. This naturally invoked conversations about independence and the safeguarding of Taiwan’s democracy. As the narrative shifts, these terms have become less important, Professor Huang mentions.

Disagreement on how to deal with China

Despite the toned down language, the pan-green camp continues to emphasize strengthening Taiwan’s defense, actively trying to persuade the voters that this is the most effective strategy to deal with China. Pan-green candidates believe preventing conflict should be done through deterrence, and that a stronger military will make China think twice about making rash decisions. Figure 3 shows this, as the percentage of pan-green candidates who support bolstering national defense capabilities has risen from 10.68% in 2020 to 28.38% in 2024.

Another notable development in the pan-green camp is the absence of proposals for negotiation and collaboration with China, which had been modestly present in the last term. This reveals that they show little expectation of any form of contact with the mainland. It confirms that pan-green considers military power to be the most effective way to safeguard Taiwan's national interests and security.

Figure 3:

 

Looking more closely, this increase in calls for improving Taiwan’s military capabilities is most noticeable in the southern regions: Chiayi City, Chiayi County, Kaohsiung City, Pingtung City, and Tainan City. This is also where a majority of the pan-green supporters are located. In the region’s bulletins, more than 55% of the pan-green candidates expressed their support for the issue, specifically discussing the construction of Taiwan’s submarines, as they play a crucial part in Taiwan’s maritime defense capabilities. Additionally, local legislators there also hope that submarine construction can spark economic development for the region’s shipbuilding industry, according to Chien-Yuan Sher, an associate professor at the Department of Business Management, National Sun Yat-sen University.

 

Figure 4:

Contrary to pan-green’s emphasis on national defense, the pan-blue camp appears to be avoiding any potential escalation by pursuing closer collaboration, and to a lesser extent formal negotiations, with China. As shown in figure 5, the percentage of candidates who advocate for closer collaborations has increased from 12.34% to 24.62%. Despite these calls for closer ties, pan-blue has kept silent on the prospects of more extreme measures such as unification or a formal peace agreement. Moreover, the number of pan-blue candidates who openly called for formal negotiations with China has fallen from 8.64% to 3.08%. This shows that pan-blue is careful not to touch on any unpopular solutions that may scare away potential voters, says professor Chen. 

Figure 5:

TPP relatively quiet

In the 2024 elections, the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) is aiming to establish itself as a key minor player, with a particular focus on the legislator-at-large results. The limited number of district candidates from the TPP makes it challenging to derive comprehensive insights from their campaigns. The TPP’s overall China strategy is ambiguous compared to the two main camps. They have stated that they are open for collaboration, but have also openly committed to increase military spending to 3.08% of Taiwan’s GDP, according to Ko Wen-Je’s Facebook posts. This ambiguous strategy is reflected by the limited number of election bulletins represented in Figure 6. It is still unclear how the TPP’s increased popularity will impact Taiwan’s political environment. 

Figure 6:

 

The outcome of Taiwan's legislative election is expected to significantly shape the nation's future political landscape. Even though the DPP is expected to win the presidency, latest polls suggest that the KMT may obtain a majority in the Legislative Yuan. For now, it is still unclear how the ‘anti-war’ narrative will eventually play out in the Legislative Yuan. The KMT and DPP hold opposing views on how to deal with China. Wu points to an impending political drama unfolding in Taiwan after the election. A critical event to pay attention to concerns the Legislative Yuan, where elected legislators will elect the legislative speaker (formally called president). This scenario sets the stage for a significant decision by the TPP; if this party becomes a strategic minority, it must decide whether to collaborate with the KMT or the DPP. The TPP’s decision will be a potential indicator of how the war/peace framework, which has been a central theme during the campaign, will influence the post-election political landscape.

Note: The data for this article was gathered from the election bulletins released by the Taiwanese Central Election Commission (CEC). Bulletins from the 2020 and 2024 terms were downloaded, and all candidate policies were manually reviewed and labeled before calculation.

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About the project:

To provide insightful information about the 2024 Taiwanese presidential and legislative elections, CommonWealth Magazine has collaborated with the International College of Innovation, National Chengchi University (NCCU) in Taiwan, and the Election Study Center of NCCU, to open a capstone course, titled “Practice of Data Analysis”. NCCU students from different countries collaborated in this course by employing their coding skills and political knowledge to produce data-driven stories about the 2024 Taiwanese presidential and legislative elections.

The main instructor is Chung-pei Pien, Assistant Professor of International College of Innovation, NCCU (@pienici)

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About the authors:

Jasper Hewitt 嘉博, from the Netherlands, graduate student at the International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies at NCCU. He is passionate about data-driven research into political issues. 

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/jasper-hewitt-2929a123a/ 

Schawin Kongthawee 康智利, from Thailand, graduate student in the International Master’s Program in International Communications (IMICS) at NCCU. He is an aspiring research exploring people’s relationships with modern technology and its culture.

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/schawink/

Bolortungalag Enkhjargal 恩葛拉, from Mongolia, undergraduate student in the International College of Innovation at NCCU. She is on a quest to fuse data insights with imaginative flair.

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/ebolortungalag/ 

Leo Chang 張澤恩, from Taiwan, graduate student of Global Communication and Innovation Technology at NCCU

Lai I An 賴怡安, from Brazil, undergraduate student at International Relations at Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) and exchange student at the Diplomacy Department at NCCU.

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/lai-i-an/ 

Claire Tsai 蔡欣妤, from Taiwan, graduate student of Global Communication and Innovation Technology at NCCU.

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/clairetsai15/

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Have you read?

• William Lai: Not just “Tsai Ing-Wen 2.0”
• Taiwan presidential candidate Hou: The first thing I want to do is take away the fear
• A decade later, the Ko Wen-je whirlwind is back

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