I am speaking from Washington, D.C., where I live and work. My remarks today are intended to focus on two questions from a Washington perspective.

The first question is, how will America's politics impact its policy toward Taiwan in the coming year? 

The United States will have its presidential and legislative elections this November. The two likeliest presidential candidates at this point are Joe Biden and Donald Trump. President Trump will want to talk a lot about China in the election, viewing it as a vehicle for making his case that America needs a strong leader. Trump wants the arguments on China to be about strong versus weak, arguing that President Biden has been weak and that he would be strong in dealing with China.

President Biden, by contrast, will want to focus the presidential election on something else - President Trump's unfitness to serve in the office of the presidency. He will argue that Trump is a threat to American democracy, that he will abandon America's allies and partners, and weaken America's leadership in the world.

In other words, President Biden wants to keep the focus of the debate on Trump, not on China. This political imperative will inform the Biden administration's policies in the year ahead, incentivizing them to be tough, consistent, and predictable in handling China issues with the goal of keeping the U.S.-China relationship functional and manageable.

When China does arise as a topic of debate, President Biden will try to create a contrast between himself and President Trump, arguing that the choice on China is a choice between competence versus chaos. President Biden and his team represent competent management, firm management of the challenge that China poses. They have put in place investments at home and alliances abroad to put America in a stronger position to deal with China.

President Trump, by contrast, would act impulsively and erratically in ways that would be destabilizing. The second point that President Biden will make is that he has kept in place all of the tariffs that President Trump implemented toward China. And on top of that, he has added export controls and outbound investment screening mechanisms to protect America against Chinese predations.

In a nutshell, these will be the terms of the political debate at the presidential level around China in the year ahead. Members of Congress will have a voice and be involved in the debate. But major legislation on China or Taiwan is not expected in the coming year. Congress likely will only be in session until July, after which members of Congress will return to their home districts to run for re-election.

The key takeaway is that there won't be much of a market in Washington for major shifts or adjustments in America's policy towards China or Taiwan. Rather, the Biden administration will work to minimize distractions from their focus on President Trump.

For Republicans and President Trump, while they will bring up China often, they will be much more seized by issues like immigration and crime than they will be on China. 

Under these circumstances, it will make sense for the incoming Lai administration to make steady progress where possible in trying to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan relations.

Building upon the strong foundation that President Tsai has built with the Biden administration, areas where progress can be made include working to accelerate the delivery of defense equipment to Taiwan, strengthening stockpiles in Taiwan of critical munitions, medicines, food, and energy.

Additionally, efforts to diversify Taiwan's external drivers of economic growth, supporting robust investment by Taiwan in the United States, and building relations among Taiwan and America's governors and mayors will be crucial.

– The second question, how will the U.S.-Taiwan-China triangle evolve in 2024? 

Looking ahead to the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle in the year ahead, my base case expectation is that there will be turbulence, but it should be fairly manageable. None of the three leaders in Taipei, Beijing, or Washington benefit from an uncontrolled spike in tensions. In fact, all three leaders have significant incentives to avoid such an outcome.

For President Xi, his top focus for the year ahead is on repairing, rebuilding, and developing China's economy. He has signaled that he does not intend to do any favors to anyone in Taiwan, continuing to apply pressure on Taiwan, including operating militarily more frequently and in closer proximity.

This is part of Beijing's long-term effort to wear down the psychological will of the people of Taiwan to resist Chinese pressure. Absent a significant move by Taiwan or by the United States, I don't expect Beijing to significantly deviate from the current course in dealing with Taiwan.

President Xi does not need to resolve the Taiwan issue in the near term, but he cannot afford to be seen as permanently losing Taiwan from Beijing's perspective. I do not expect that President-elect Lai or his team will take significant moves to alter the status quo in the coming year.

They will want to build confidence at home and abroad that they are reliable, competent stewards and guardians of the status quo. For President Biden, he does not have an incentive to make major policy initiatives on Taiwan or on China. He does not want cross-strait tensions to be front-page news and prefers competent, steady, and professional management of the issues.

Events can intervene to throw this delicate set of relations off track. The three most prominent risks are in the South China Sea, North Korea, and U.S.-China trade tensions. If the situation around Second Thomas Shoal were to escalate significantly, it could put U.S. and Chinese forces in proximity and lead to increasing strategic pressure around Taiwan.

In the case of North Korea, if Kim Jong-un launches provocations in the second half of this year to try to discredit and embarrass President Biden, it could put pressure on the United States and China to work together to manage and defuse a crisis. 

The third major risk is the U.S.-China trade tensions. If the U.S. increases protection against Chinese exports related to new drivers of economic growth, Beijing could feel compelled to respond with a tit-for-tat dynamic. 

In conclusion, focusing on two narrow questions: how will politics impact policy in the United States in 2024, and how will the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle evolve in the coming year?

On the first question, politics will have a significant impact on America's China policy in the coming year. President Biden's top priority is to win re-election, making everything else subordinate to that goal. While he will not pull any punches in dealing with China, neither will he be looking for confrontation. The base case for the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle is likely to follow its current trajectory of intensifying competition.

There aren't many scenarios where tensions will lessen, but none of the three leaders see incentive for significantly dialing up tensions either.