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Global Taiwan Institute

New Polling Data Reflect Deepening Taiwanese Identity

New Polling Data Reflect Deepening Taiwanese Identity

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In a series of polls conducted annually and released by the National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center in Taiwan, the most recent results released on July 10, 2019 reflect a shift which highlights a strengthening sense of Taiwanese identity, preference for the status quo, and party identification over recent years. 

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New Polling Data Reflect Deepening Taiwanese Identity

By Russell Hsiao / Global Taiwan Institute
web only

In a series of polls conducted annually and released by the National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center in Taiwan, which surveys people’s political attitudes towards national identity, independence or unification, and party identification since 1992, the most recent results released on July 10, 2019 reflect a shift which highlights a strengthening sense of Taiwanese identity, preference for the status quo, and party identification over recent years. 

On people’s national identity of being either “Taiwanese” or “Chinese,” the most recent polls conducted in June 2019 show that 56.9 percent of respondents identify as Taiwanese (up from 54.5 in 2018), 36.5 percent identify as being both Taiwanese and Chinese (down from 38.2 in 2018), and those identifying as being only Chinese at 3.6 percent (down from 3.7 in 2018), with a 3.0 percent (down from 3.6 in 2018) of non-respondents.

Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University

Interestingly, the increase in people’s identification as Taiwanese follows a year-on-year drop since the peak of Taiwanese identification in 2014 at 60.6 percent (the year of the Sunflower Movement) for four consecutive years through 2018 when it reached 54.5 percent. 

When asked about people’s preference for independence or unification, the most recent polling data show a consistent and overwhelming support among the respondents for maintaining some form of the “status quo” with an aggregate total of 86.1 percent.

More interestingly, a deeper dive into the polling data shows that 30.6 percent of respondents indicated that they prefer to maintain the status quo and decide later (down from 33.4 percent in 2018), 26.9 percent prefer to maintain the status quo indefinitely (up from 24 percent in 2018), whereas 19.9 percent prefer to maintain status quo and move towards independence (up from 15.1 in 2018), and 8.7 percent prefer to maintain status quo and move towards unification (down from 12.8 in 2018). Moreover, 6.3 percent preferred to not respond (down from 6.6 in 2018), 5.8 percent of those polled stated that they prefer independence as soon as possible (up from 5.0 percent in 2018), and only 1.7 percent stated that they want unification as soon as possible (down from 3.1 percent in 2018).

On people’s party identification, the most recent polling data also show that a plurality of respondents still identifies as independent or provided a non-response at 42.5 percent (down from 49.1 percent from in 2018). Interestingly, party identification for both the ruling party (the DPP) and the opposition party (the KMT) increased with 24.5 percent identifying as DPP supporters (up from 20.1), and 27.6 percent of respondents identifying as KMT supporters (up from 25.4 percent). Moreover, 4.7 percent of respondents said they identify themselves as New Power Party (NPP) supporters (up from 4.0 percent), while other parties received less than 1 percent. 

In a separate poll publicly released on July 19 by the country’s government-sponsored national democracy assistance foundation, the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD), which gauges the people’s willingness to fight against China’s invasion, among those polled, 57.4 percent said that if China were to launch an attack in response to Taiwan’s declaration of independence, they would be willing to go to war to defend Taiwan. This is up from 55 percent in 2018. The same poll also shows that the percentage of respondents who would be unwilling to fight also dropped to 31 percent from 35.9 percent in 2018.

The previous year’s poll, which was released in a public seminar at the Global Taiwan Institute, also unveiled a more detailed look into the question of the youth’s willingness to fight. When asked specifically: “Would you fight for Taiwan if mainland China uses force against Taiwan for unification?” 70.3 percent of the respondents under the age of 39 said “yes” and only 26.5 percent said “no.” Whereas, 66.1 percent of the respondents above 40 years of age said “yes” and 24.9 percent said “no.”

When asked: “Would you fight for Taiwan if Taiwan formally announced independence that causes mainland China to use force against Taiwan?” 63.4 percent of respondents under the age of 39 said “yes,” and only 32.6 percent of respondents said “no”; whereas 49.9 percent of the people above 40 said “yes,” and 39.2 percent said “no.”

Contrary to Beijing’s belief and some concerns in Washington of Taiwan’s resiliency, including whether the people in Taiwan have the will to fight, polling data indicates that a majority of people in Taiwan will fight if China invades the island. China’s intensifying pressure campaign against Taiwan has coincided with the increase in the people’s willingness to fight to defend Taiwan, an increased sense of the Taiwanese identity felt among the people in Taiwan, as well as society’s consolidated preference for the status quo.

The main point: China’s intensification of its pressure campaign against Taiwan has coincided with the increase in the people of Taiwan’s willingness to fight, as well as the society’s strengthening sense of a Taiwanese identity, preference for the status quo, and party identification.

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Global Taiwan Institute is a DC-based think tank dedicated to enhancing the relationship between Taiwan and other countries, especially the United States, through policy research and programs that promote better public understanding about Taiwan and its people.

Original content can be found at the website of Global Taiwan Institute. The views expressed in the article are the author's and do not represent those of the Global Taiwan Institute.

This article is reproduced under the permission of Global Taiwan Institute and terms of Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 Unported License (“CCPL”). It presents the opinion or perspective of the original author / organization, which does not represent the standpoint of CommonWealth magazine.

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