China's perception of "Taiwanese independence" has shifted, extending beyond the constitutional notion of "de jure Taiwanese independence" to encompass cultural dimensions. Li Yihu, a Beijing-based Taiwan affairs expert and long-time member of China's National People's Congress Foreign Affairs Committee, remarked shortly after the conclusion of the recent Two Sessions (the annual plenary sessions of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) to the media, "After (incoming president) William Lai, there may be a focus on promoting 'cultural Taiwanese independence,' which is worth noting."

This is closely related to the Sunflower Movement of a decade ago. Since then, young people have become a key focal point of Beijing’s strategy toward Taiwan.

The March 2014 Sunflower Movement put a halt to the constant progression of cross-strait integration.

“They are keen to look for reasons,” said Esteban Wang, Distinguished Professor at the Chengchi University Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies, recalling subsequent exchanges with scholars from the PRC.

Beijing has consistently attributed the immediate cause of the student movement to the intervention and mobilization efforts of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). A more deep-seated reason is a series of educational reforms promoting “de-Sinicization,” altering the identity of Taiwanese youths.

“There is no distinct boundary between politics and culture; to a certain extent, culture can also become political,” offers Bao Chengke, deputy director of the School of Advanced International and Area Studies at East China Normal University in Shanghai, shedding light on China’s interest in Taiwan’s cultural policies.

Bao noted that Taiwan’s student movement helped Beijing realize that efforts directed at Taiwanese youth and disadvantaged groups could be intensified and refined.

Lin Chu-chia, head of the Kuomintang’s (KMT) Mainland Affairs Department, observes that many of Beijing’s “beneficial” policies toward Taiwan of late have been aimed at young people.

China's approach towards Taiwan evolves along with changing cross-strait dynamics, targeting specific groups with precision.

With the easing of cross-strait relations in the 1990s, the focus of efforts towards Taiwan was attracting Taiwanese investment. The Eight Points proposed by late PRC President Jiang Zemin in 1996 solidified this approach.

After the DPP came to power, Hu Jintao introduced “Hu’s Four Points,” emphasizing “hope in the Taiwanese people,” benefitting the general public with direct procurement of agricultural goods by bypassing the Taiwanese government, thereby entering what has been termed a period of “unilateral concessions.”

After waiting for the KMT to return to power, Hu Jintao once again proposed “Hu’s Six Points” aimed at advancing cross-strait economic cooperation, and promoting the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and the Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement (TISA).

Following the Sunflower Movement, China introduced the Three Middles, One Youth guidelines: in addition to continued focus on small- and medium-size enterprises, middle- to low-income households, and the middle (central) and southern Taiwan regions, “youths” became a priority cohort.

Esteban Wang characterized the PRC’s Taiwan policy as "away game favoritism." From agricultural procurement to trade concessions, all benefactions were carried out on Taiwan's turf, fostering more interaction with the Taiwanese government.

But everything changed in 2017, when Beijing rolled out the One Generation, One Front (young generation and grassroots front). On the surface this was not too far off from the Three Middle, One Youth policy. However, Xi Jinping, unwilling to engage with President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration, sought Taiwanese people to “integrate and develop” across the strait in the PRC.

Esteban Wang described PRC policy towards Taiwan from that point forward as “home field integration.” Beijing successively introduced "favorable” policies, granting Taiwanese people "equal treatment" in the PRC. The "31 Measures for Favorable Treatment of Taiwan,” introduced in 2018, attempted to attract Taiwanese talent in such fields as finance and healthcare, shifting from "favorable treatment for Taiwan" to "hindering Taiwan." Have these methods proven effective?

On the one-year anniversary of implementation of the 31 Measures, the Mainland Affairs Council noted that in that year the sum of investments by Taiwanese businesses across the strait dropped by 8.1 percent. Similarly, in 2017 the number of Taiwanese employed in the PRC also slid to 405,000.

Looking at the longer term time scale, last year investment in the PRC reached a record low of 3.04 billion USD, while only 177,000 were still working across the strait in 2022. The effectiveness of these series of "favorable” policies towards Taiwan has been mediocre.

Whether the shared economic dividends are sufficient to shift the self-identification of young Taiwanese across the strait remains to be seen. However, according to surveys conducted by the Chengchi University Election Study Center, those identifying themselves as “Taiwanese” rose from 54.5 to 61.7 percent between 2018 and 2023, while just 2.4 percent identified as “Chinese,” with dual identity holding steady around 30 percent. This proves that policy towards Taiwan has not effectively shifted the Taiwanese public’s identity.

Still, the CCP will not simply desist in its efforts. Esteban Wang stresses that Beijing has always taken a carrot and stick approach to Taiwan, opting for stronger measures when attractiveness drops. ‘War and Peace’ and ‘Prosperity and Decline’ will continue to be the choices that Beijing demands that Taiwanese youth face going forward.

Have you read?

• How can China maintain 5% GDP growth with 'new productive forces'?
• Following Kinmen patrol fatalities, will China keep challenging the Taiwan Strait median line?
• China's annual Two Sessions: How will they impact Taiwan?

Translated by David Toman
Uploaded by Ian Huang