It seems like history has played a joke on Kinmen.

“In order to prevent a negligent discharge, we replaced the first round in the chamber with a blank,” says Mr. Liu (a pseudonym), who was once stationed on Kinmen as a coastal patrol officer, recalling a night back in 2011. He can still picture the scene vividly in his mind.

A little earlier that day, Taiwan’s Coast Guard encountered resistance with bamboo poles and rocks while attempting to clear a fishing vessel from Fujian that had strayed into Taiwanese territory. After the arrest of four fishermen, 83 other fishermen from the same village rushed over in support.

Twenty eight fishing vessels from Fujian surrounded Kinmen’s Lieyu and Luocuo Fishing Port, chanting “let them go” and “release the boat.”

Over 100 coastal patrol forces rushing to the scene from Kinmen, fully armed and on full alert, surrounded the fishermen in turn. Since the lifting of military governance over Kinmen in 1994, this was the first occasion of tensions between Taiwanese coast guard and Chinese fishermen.

Thirteen years later, another conflict involving the encroachment of Kinmen’s territorial waters took place.

Fishing? Smuggling? Or militia?

On February 14, Kinmen coastal patrol pursued a “Three Noes” fishing vessel from China, resulting in the death of two Chinese crewmen after the boat capsized.

The term "Three Noes" vessels - denoting ships without a registered name, an official maritime certificate, or registered nationality - represent a significant focus in cross-strait law enforcement efforts. These vessels pose risks associated with illegal fishing and smuggling, making them prime targets for crackdown initiatives.

What was this vessel doing in Kinmen?

Kinmen County councilman Senpo Tung, who hails from a family deeply rooted in the fishing industry, pointed out that the small and narrow hull and twin engines of this particular vessel suggest it was designed for high-speed use. Some have raised suspicions of its involvement in smuggling, yet Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) has not uncovered any evidence to support such claims.

Based on information disclosed by the media, Mr. Liu reckons that, with the presence of a net hoist on board, unaccompanied by nets or fish, raises the possibility that this vessel may have come to retrieve previously deployed nets around Kinmen.

A collision without video evidence

Following the incident, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration issued a statement asserting that the fishing vessel capsized accidentally while fleeing from an inspection. As for whether a collision occurred, they did not disclose such details.

It was only after two survivors returned to China and claimed that the vessel was knocked over by the Coast Guard that the statement was revised. The Coast Guard then stated that the fishing boat swerved sharply in an attempt to evade pursuit, causing it to collide with the patrol boat's stern, lose its balance, and then capsize.

The challenge lies in the fact that the Coast Guard lacks video evidence of the incident. 

The CGA claims that due to the high-speed chase, Coast Guard officers responsible for collecting evidence were too focused on maintaining balance and preparing to board the fleeing vessel to gather the equipment together for real-time documentation.

In essence, the patrol team members failed to follow protocol for evidence collection during the pursuit.

A former Coast Guard member privately revealed that, in the past, on-duty officers would have hand-held camcorders for evidence gathering. "If illegal activities were discovered, evidence would later be handed over to the prosecutor; relying solely on written statements is insufficient."

The failure to present convincing evidence promptly in the face of two lost lives prompted China's Taiwan Affairs Office to publicly deny for the first time, three days after the incident, the Kinmen maritime restrictions concerning the commonly-known "median line between Kinmen and Xiamen." 

This move is seen as initiating a legal battle challenging the longstanding tacit political understanding between the two sides.

The China Coast Guard, often regarded as “China’s second navy,” even declared that it would initiate "routine law enforcement patrols" in the waters between Kinmen and Xiamen the following day. Over the subsequent seven days, various Chinese government vessels, including the Coast Guard and China Marine Surveillance, repeatedly entered Kinmen's territorial waters.

Currently, Taiwanese judicial authorities are investigating the incident. However, observers wonder whether, as the outcome of the investigation becomes increasingly clear, will the incident escalate tensions between the two sides.

From a political perspective, "de-escalation" remains the common denominator between the two sides.

PRC Central Government Officials Appear in Kinmen

One week after the maritime conflict in Kinmen, CommonWealth reporters traveled there to investigate.

Arriving at the entrance of Ludao Hotel, the first mainland Chinese-invested hotel in Kinmen, three middle-aged men could be observed huddling together by the side of the road with serious expressions on their faces, engaging in a hushed conversation and occasionally making calls.

They turned out to be Chinese representatives preparing to negotiate with the Taiwanese side, namely: Li Zhaohui, Deputy Director of the Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau Affairs Office of Quanzhou City; Cao Rongshan, Secretary-General of the Red Cross Society of Jinjiang City; and consultant Xu Weiwei.

Li Zhaohui (left); Xu Weiwei (mid), and Cao Rongshan (right). (Photo: Chien-Ying Chiu)

Insiders relate that although Li was the nominal head of the delegation, in fact Xu Weiwei, obscured behind the title of "consultant," was the "key figure."

Xu’s official position is the Director of the Coordination Department of the China Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). He is the first representative of the central government’s Taiwan affairs establishment to set foot on Taiwan to handle a crisis since the COVID-19 pandemic. 

As of the end of February, his delegation from the PRC has met with Taiwan’s representatives, headed by CGA deputy director-general Hsu Ching-chih, at least 10 times. The meetings have taken place at various locations from the Hotel River Kinmen, where the Taiwanese side stayed, to the nearby Ludao Hotel, a five-minute car ride away.

While Beijing is reluctant to label them "official negotiations," the close coordination indicates a willingness and room for dialogue between the two sides.

Kinmen remains critical focus of PRC’s Taiwan integration strategy

Officials familiar with cross-strait affairs note that the two sides continue their discussions because the PRC side insists on a public apology and acknowledgement of fault from the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration before proceeding to discuss compensation for the families of the deceased. However, the Taiwanese side holds that these issues should be addressed independently from each other.

“Leaders on both sides of the strait do not wish to escalate the crisis,” observes Chang Wu-Ueh, Mainland Affairs Council advisor and director of the Graduate Institute of China Studies at Tamkang University. “Since the incident occurred, the People’s Daily newspaper, the national standard-bearer in China, has not published a single news article or commentary.”

Further examining recent official statements from China, in past maritime conflicts in the South China Sea or East China Sea, emphasis was often placed on Chinese coast guard vessels operating in their "territorial waters." 

However, the wording of the latest statement from the China Coast Guard only highlights the effective safeguarding of the "relevant waters," signifying a nuanced stance, according to Huang Chung Ting, associate research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research Division of Chinese Politics, Military and Warfighting Concepts.

A week after the conflict, Beijing held its annual Taiwan Work Conference. The external communiqué reveals that the fundamental approach towards Taiwan remains "anti-independence and pro-unification" while aiming to "deepen cross-strait integration and development." 

Kinmen, for its part not only serves as the latest test zone for cross-strait integration in Fujian Province, but also an experimental point for the deployment of Beijing's Taiwan strategy.

Both sides face domestic pressures to assert a strong stance, yet from a practical standpoint, China does not intend to perpetually disregard the "median line between Kinmen and Xiamen." Doing so would only hinder cross-strait law enforcement efforts to combat smuggling.

"If this line didn’t exist, would our vessels crossing over be considered encroachment? Would it be considered smuggling if vessels exchange cargo?" asks Councilman Tung.

Given the current cross-strait dynamics, it is expected that the crisis will be contained. However, Beijing may not have anticipated that the China Coast Guard patrols would make people of Kinmen, situated on the "frontlines of united front work," uneasy.

Highlighting the weakest link of cross-strait relations

On February 19th, China Coast Guard personnel boarded the yacht First Day in the waters near Dadan Island.

Operated by the family of former Kinmen County Magistrate Yang Cheng-wu, this sightseeing boat had been in operation for over two years before it was boarded by China’s coast guard for the first time.

"In the past few days, fewer fishermen have gone out to sea," said Chen Shui-yi, president of the Kinmen Fishermen's Association. Pointing to fishing boats in the harbor, he said that apart from recent unfavorable sea conditions, fishermen have also been apprehensive about the news of increased patrols by the China Coast Guard.

“The fishermen aren’t afraid of the coast guard; it's Chinese fishing boats they fear," said Mr. Hung, a retired military officer and angler. He expressed that the Chinese coast guard only creates an image of the capability for conducting inspections, but that is unlikely to harass Taiwanese fishing vessels. What worries them more is whether more mainland fishing boats, with the coast guard's backing, will brazenly trespass into Taiwanese waters.

As of our publishing deadline, cross-strait negotiations continue behind closed doors. 

Looking at the situation, could the resolution of the crisis 13 years ago offer a useful reference?

Recalling those days as a former coast guard officer, Mr. Liu mentioned that when the Chinese Public Security Border Defense Forces obtained information from the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration, they immediately made calls directing the fishermen that were leading the commotion to return home.

The key was mutual trust and a willingness by both sides to take a step back.

The weakest link of current cross-strait relations lies in a fickle overall environment.

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Have you read?

• Ryan Hass on U.S.-Taiwan-China triangle: turbulence ahead but manageable
• Can Taiwan be the bridge between China and the US?
• China vs. Taiwan: The battle for diplomatic allies 

Translated by David Toman
Uploaded by Ian Huang