On July 21, the Hong Kong Civil Human Rights Front held a democracy march, which police dispersed in the evening using a large contingent of officers. At the same time, shocking rumors spread that more than a thousand “White Shirts” had gathered in Yuen Long and even entered the subway station wielding sticks and bats, chasing and collectively hitting citizens and journalists. A total of 45 people were injured.

In this opinion piece, veteran commentator Simon Lau, a former advisor to the Hong Kong government, analyzes the political context behind the scenes from the British colonial era to today’s one country, two systems framework and the political realities the Hong Kong people must now face.

As Hong Kong marked the 22nd anniversary of its handover from British colonial rule to Chinese sovereignty on July 1, people protesting a controversial extradition bill occupied the Legislative Council building. Mass media reporting focused on the smashing of the door to the city parliament and other “violent” actions.

However, the most symbolic act was the splashing of black paint onto Hong Kong’s bauhinia emblem and the unfurling of a British colonial flag on the speaker’s podium. The portraits of former LegCo presidents were defaced with graffiti; only the portraits of two speakers of the pre-handover period, Sir John Joseph Swaine and Andrew Wong, escaped virtually unscathed.

The news photograph that the New York Times carried on its frontpage on that day speaks volumes about what has become of the One Country, Two Systems framework in these 22 years.

Source: Reuters

Rule Through Local Elites Gone Bad

By 1842, when Hong Kong became a crown colony of the British Empire, a mature system of governance to control colonies had already emerged, known as indirect rule. Its theoretical underpinnings are attributed to the work of Frederick Lugard, who served as governor of Hong Kong between 1907 and 1912 and subsequently as colonial governor of Nigeria. His book The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, published in 1922, is kept at the library of the University of Hong Kong (HKU), which Lugard founded.  

Photo by Ming-Tang Huang/CW

Drawing conclusions from his governance experience in Africa, Lugard proposed the concept of indirect rule. He believed that governing through local rulers would help prevent anti-British resistance in the colonies. And since the collaborating native leaders had considerable legitimacy, Britain would gain political support through these intermediaries in what effectively constituted a dual mandate.

These were also the political considerations when Lugard founded HKU, since he wanted to absorb the local Chinese elite into the administrative system. In the following nearly 100 years, Hong Kong thoroughly implemented the spirit of indirect rule. As a result, Hong Kong’s colonial government was able to suppress the leftist riots in 1967 with the support of the mainstream Hong Kong Chinese elite.   

The biggest change in Hong Kong in the 22 years since 1997 is not the transfer of sovereignty, but rather the direct rule model that the Communist Party of China seeks to implement through the party-state machinery. These efforts have markedly gained speed since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. The turmoil in June, triggered by the extradition bill amendments, is in fact a huge, fundamental backlash against direct rule by Communist China.

Two Governance Teams

Indirect rule meant forging an alliance with establishment interests. The colonial government shared power to a certain degree with the members of this alliance, such as the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, New Territories Heung Yee Kuk [heads of rural committees], and co-opted the professional elite through various advisory bodies. Before announcing new policies, the government would first canvass support from the major members of the alliance, and then rely on their influence in society to generate broad public support.

As a result, British-ruled Hong Kong put on a civilized cloak called consultative democracy, under which it painstakingly concealed evil colonial laws [such as The Public Order Ordinance] as well as anti-riot military and police forces that it had ready behind the scenes just in case. 

On June 12, Hong Kong police forcibly dispersed anti-extradition bill protesters, firing bean bag rounds and volleys of tear gas, much to the dismay of society at large. (Photo by Ming-Tang Huang/CW)

In the first decade after the 1997 handover, Hong Kong continued to use the indirect rule model until 500,000 people took to the streets in 2003 to protest the government’s proposal, backed by Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, to implement Article 23 of the Basic Law. China feared that the large-scale demonstrations in Hong Kong could affect national security. On top of that, the leaders in Beijing felt threatened due to the various “color revolutions” unfolding in the former Soviet Union.

Therefore, Zeng Qinghong, head of China’s top body on Hong Kong and Macao affairs, postulated that China needed “to have something done” in Hong Kong. From then on, staffing at the China’s liaison office in Hong Kong ballooned, and its scope of control expanded from the Chinese political establishment in Hong Kong such as local organizations and members of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese Political Consultative Conference in the past, to infiltrating elections at all levels, political parties, disciplined services unions, the civil service, chambers of commerce, educational institutions, mass media and even religious organizations. 

Listen to the Party, Follow the Party

When Tung stepped down in 2005, Donald Tsang, a civil servant during British rule, was reactivated. He cultivated a rather relaxed atmosphere while also tightening and expanding Chinese direct rule in Hong Kong. After Xi and [Hong Kong’s third Chief Executive] CY Leung both took office in 2012, Xi in his “dare to bare the sword” manner set out to “slam the door shut” on political reforms in the territory. His intention to implement a birdcage democracy in Hong Kong triggered the Umbrella Movement.

After the Umbrella Movement, the government went after protesting youth and the Occupy Central initiators in the name of countering Hong Kong independence activism, which led to even deeper divisions in society. Using the same old trick, China withdrew Leung and replaced him with Carry Lam, who is from a similar civil service background as Tsang.

After taking office, the double-faced Lam carried out Beijing’s hardline policy. Predictably, Lam lived up to expectations, successfully implementing ideological screening of electoral candidates, and ramming the controversial co-location joint checkpoint scheme [for the high-speed rail link between Hong Kong and Guangzhou] through the Legislature, which earned her massive praise from the central government in Beijing. The extradition bill surfaced against this backdrop. 

Hong Kong citizens have plastered the outer walls of the Central Government Offices with colorful sticky notes carrying messages in support of the anti-extradition bill marches. (Photo by Ming-Tang Huang/CW)

The only beneficiary of the extradition bill is China. Had it respected the members of the governing alliance, this policy would most likely not have seen the light of day, since Hong Kong’s business community, professionals, foreign chambers of commerce, religious circles and even the pro-Beijing political parties all opposed the legislation.

However, with the direct rule model already firmly in place, China no longer needed to enlist the support of intermediaries. After Wang Zhimin, the director of the central government’s liaison office in Hong Kong, summoned the leaders of Hong Kong’s political establishment and declared that the central government supported Lam’s stance, Lam could, of course, afford to get on her high horse.

When one million people took to the streets on June 9, Lam decided, even before the protest march had ended, to resume debate of the bill in the Legislative Council on June 12, whatever it took. 

Ramming Through a Controversial Bill

Lam’s highhandedness was nothing more than a fox exploiting a tiger’s might, as she relied on Beijing to quell opposition among the local business community and the political parties. As for the Legislative Council, which the Chinese liaison office has in the palm of its hand, she decided that, as long as it convened for a session on June 12 protected by fully armed riot police, the bill was bound to be passed.

Lam’s tough approach revealed that the SAR had already become part of China’s stability maintenance apparatus, which relies on law enforcement troops to prop up its entire rule. Originally, she reckoned that all she needed was the support of the party-state apparatus as she thought nothing of the Hong Kong people’s opposition movement.

In the end, Beijing compromised at a critical moment, a move that had to do with the escalation of the power struggle between China and the United States. China did not want to open another front due to new complications. 

Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam (Photo by Ming-Tang Huang/CW)

Yet when Lam announced the suspension of the bill’s reading, the political crisis was still not over, as the public demanded that the bill be completely withdrawn and the events of June 12 be investigated. As Lam again turned a deaf ear to these demands despite a string of suicides [by anti-extradition protestors], anger grew among the young people of Hong Kong, which led to the occupation of the Legislative Council on July 1. Again, Lam had the backing of Beijing for her hardline attitude.

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A New Democracy Movement

The movement this time has created solidarity among the Hong Kong people, ending the rifts and sense of powerlessness that the Umbrella Movement had left behind.

At the same time, however, Hong Kong is now on a much more arduous protest path. Since the 1980s, democracy movements in Hong Kong have never been suppressed by the government. The British used representative government to take the steam out of the democracy movement as democracy activists became parliamentarians who no longer took to the streets. In the early 1990s, the opposition movement had already become an election game. That’s a very British kind of cleverness. 

In contrast, China’s hardline approach – baring its sword as it pleases with police in full armor frequently showing off their might in front of demonstrators – only shows that they lack the political tools to solve differences. They invariably resort to the stability maintenance model used in China, yet Hong Kong is not Wukan [a village in Guangdong Province where several anti-corruption protests were suppressed] but an international metropolis and global financial center.

It is foreseeable that Hong Kong’s democracy movement will have to say good-bye to the “painless” situation of the past. On this road, there will be a growing number of political prisoners, exiled people and more sacrificed lives, because China’s iron-fisted approach is all-encompassing and does not only target Hong Kong. It also includes the suppression of the human rights movement in China, forced thought reform in Xinjiang, and the surveillance of the entire nation through big data.

The anti-extradition movement has turned into a new democracy movement as the Hong Kong people gradually figure out that the time has come to directly confront China.

Under direct rule, there are no intermediaries or proxies who can act as political buffers. The so-called pro-establishment camp are no more than interest groups who follow China to make a living. They have no influence to speak of when it comes to political decision-making.

Finally, it has dawned on the Hong Kong people that, no matter who steps down and who takes office, behind the scenes it is still the Chinese party-state apparatus who has Hong Kong in the palm of its hand. The Hong Kong democracy movement will evolve into a resistance movement moving directly against the Chinese Communist model. And it will face even stronger repression.

Translated by Susanne Ganz
Edited by TC Lin, Sharon Tseng

This article presents the opinion or perspective of the original author / organization, which does not represent the standpoint of CommonWealth magazine.