The source of the "2027" timeframe mentioned by outside commentators is Xi Jinping's speech on the People’s Liberation Army’s goals on the occasion of its hundredth anniversary in 2027. In his remarks, Xi stated that China is looking to achieve the military strength to compete with the United States and achieve modernization, but he never explicitly stated at what point or time that Taiwan would be invaded.

The two-handed strategy implemented since the days of Deng Xiaoping has not changed. When evaluating the CCP, it cannot be ignored that in angling for power in the wake of the 20th National Congress, various factions of the CCP must demonstrate a track record of hardline foreign relations so as not to misjudge the situation and allow cross-strait tensions to spiral.

If the gap between China and the United States in certain military realms is not significant by 2027, there could be risks. Take for example the development of medium-range missiles. The Dong-Feng 11 (DF-11), Dong-Feng 15 and Dong-Feng 16 missiles launched in the recent set of military exercises are all relatively conventional and primitive missiles.

In contrast, the Dong-Feng 21D anti-ship ballistic missile, which is specially designed to strike U.S. aircraft carriers, is China’s exclusive property, as are the Dong-Feng 26 and the hypersonic Dong-Feng 17, neither of which was launched in the recent drills.

Why were they not launched? The military exercises were intended to express a hardline stance towards U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, not to provoke a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Biden and Xi Jinping had already held a dialogue prior to her visit to Taiwan, so I would not regard this as the “Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis”, because the two sides had worked something out together.

The U.S. response was accordingly relatively low-key. So there was no way for Taiwan to respond in a hardline fashion given the low-key U.S. response to the exercises.

The hypothetical battlefield for China’s eastward missile tests is no longer the Taiwan Strait, but the Pacific Ocean to the east of Taiwan. Consequently, Taiwan's defensive and operational thinking must be adjusted.

The enemy no longer comes only from the west. In the past, eastern Taiwan was an important base for the preservation of combat power, but now PLA bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles can fly into Taiwan’s eastern airspace to attack important targets. China also has an attack group of three aircraft carriers that can dispatch fighter jets from the east to attack Taiwan and simultaneously carry out anti-access and area denial operations against the United States and Japan. These measures could prevent the American and Japanese naval and air forces from approaching Taiwan, and cut off military and economic support to Taiwan from the international community.

Our military has considered all of these issues, and has prepared appropriate responses. However, defending Taiwan not only depends on the military, but also on improving the resilience of the country and society. From the Presidential Palace to the National Security Council and the Office of Homeland Security of the Executive Yuan, we have conducted regular war games against threats.

Taking electricity resilience for example, we have increased the number of days of natural gas supplies. Strategic reserves have been increased, and we have precisely calculated energy replenishment and allocation to come up with a set of standard operating procedures in the event of an attack on electric power facilities. For instance, contracts with energy suppliers include emergency supply plans, spreading import source risks, emergency allocation, and natural gas ship dispatchment.

Another highly discussed issue is reserve mobilization and the military service system. This issue must absolutely be dealt with, since a comprehensive and robust mobilization system is one of the key deterrents to a military invasion of Taiwan by the Beijing regime.

At present, the Ministry of National Defense has carried out reforms to the mobilization system such as the establishment of the All-out Defense Mobilization Agency, which has raised the level of authority to strengthen the ability to integrate and mobilize. The reserve force responsible for coastal defense has been increased from seven brigades to 12. If each brigade had more than 4,000 personnel, the total combat force would be increased by about 50,000 troops. In addition, military academies and military training schools themselves also have reserve brigades, which can perform combat missions in wartime.

Third, we have a reserve command department in each city and county around Taiwan, with one to two brigades under the jurisdiction of each municipality. Once restructuring is completed, Taiwan’s 21 cities and counties will have over 100,000 personnel under their command. In defense of the Taiwan Strait, facing a large-scale armed invasion of Taiwan from China, 200,000 standing active troops might not be enough. The key to expanding the source of troops over the short term is the mobilization and training of our reserve troops.

Currently, mandatory military service is just four months in duration, which is likely insufficient for the completion of mid- to high-level specialized training. If more time is permitted, then when the time comes both preparation and training time can be reduced. At this time the Ministry of National Defense is leaning toward making adjustments in this direction.

At its essence, national defense is about making the best preparations for the worst eventualities. Failure to act would let down our entire citizenry.

Have you read

• Maps: China’s 72-hour ‘Taiwan blockade’
• Taiwan needs porcupine quills to deter China
• Pelosi’s Taiwan visit was a US-made crisis

Edited by TC Lin
Translated by  David Toman
Uploaded by Penny Chiang