Debates over technology sovereignty routinely halt at the point of purchase. Governments examine suppliers, component origins, ownership and jurisdiction. They use export controls, security reviews and procurement restrictions to decide which firms may enter sensitive markets. This approach treats sovereignty mainly as a question of origin and access.

Software-defined products and systems challenge this static model. A drone may pass every supply-chain and security review and still depend on its original vendor for updates, cloud authorization, maintenance data or continued support. The public agency owns the aircraft, yet some of the practical authority needed to use it remains elsewhere. Unmanned aerial vehicles make this dynamic starkly visible. Similar dependencies arise in other dual-use systems that rely on vendor-controlled software updates, data access or authorization.

As technological interdependence extends beyond the point of purchase, this structural reliance can develop into what I call a post-sale sovereignty crisis. The term describes a specific operational failure: supplier dependence materially prevents an accountable public authority from carrying out a legally mandated, time-critical mission, and no lawful, safe and affordable alternative can be activated within the required recovery time.

Public responsibility then rests with an institution that no longer has the practical control needed to act.

DJI's 2025 change to its US GEO geofencing system shows how vendor-controlled software can create post-sale sovereignty risk even without malicious intent. DJI aligned the system with Federal Aviation Administration data and returned greater discretion to operators. Operators had to connect their flight app to the internet and accept the update. I do not treat this as evidence of malicious control or a disrupted public mission. The episode may serve as an early warning: manufacturer-controlled software can alter the conditions under which equipment already in the field is used. That dependence could become a sovereignty crisis if insolvency, support withdrawal or a change in legal obligations leaves public authorities with no viable way to continue an essential mission.

Pre-sale security screening remains essential. Nationality and jurisdiction also matter in critical systems. Yet these checks cannot ensure that an approved supplier will continue to provide support or that its services can be replaced years later. Even suppliers that pass national security screening can leave public agencies or institutions dependent on services they cannot readily replace. This creates a continuity risk that pre-sale screening alone cannot resolve.

Lifecycle Trust: Bridging the Governance Gap

Lifecycle trust is a preventive framework designed to address later-stage risks. It asks governments to identify critical dependencies and preserve a credible continuity path before purchase. Lifecycle trust makes the allocation of post-sale authority a condition of the transaction, so that public responsibility remains matched by the practical ability to act. A public buyer should ask whether a defined mission can continue if a supplier exits or a critical service end. The answer must take account of recovery time, cost, legal authority and safety. It should rest on evidence that can be tested, rather than a general promise of long-term support. No buyer can foresee every disruption. It can, however, find out where control sits and what options would remain if an important relationship ended.

Questions of repair, interoperability and operational sovereignty already point in this direction. The European Commission's Cloud Sovereignty Framework asks whether actors within the European Union can operate and support technology independently of foreign control. Writing in Tech Policy Press, Eileen Donahoe and Konstantinos Komaitis have linked artificial intelligence (AI) sovereignty to interoperability and the ability to switch providers. Much of that discussion concerns data, computing services or movement between platforms. With a software-defined physical system, changing provider may affect the machine itself. Its safety status and the allocation of legal liability may also change. Public officials remain answerable for the outcome even when the decisive technical permission belongs to a vendor.

For public authorities, this technical dependence can undermine democratic governance and accountability. A public body must be able to execute lawful decisions for which citizens can hold it responsible. Governments routinely rely on private expertise, and that reliance can improve public services. The difficulty arises when officials remain responsible for a mission while lacking the practical means to direct, audit, replace or continue the service within the time available.

The practical standard is operational replaceability at the mission level.

It does not require every component or line of code to be interchangeable. Continuity might come from another maintainer, a compatible service, portable mission data, reserve capacity or replacement of the equipment. The relevant question is whether a credible path remains open when the original supplier cannot assist.

Governing Markets for Software-Defined Systems

Supplier lock-in and switching costs are familiar market problems. In software-defined public-service systems, they also raise questions about who retains the authority to keep a mission running. Software-defined products remain tied to markets for updates, authorization, data and certification after the sale. Switching becomes more expensive after deployment, which gives the incumbent vendor growing influence over the product's continued use. Competition at purchase may offer limited protection once switching becomes prohibitively costly. The buyer may have several options at the time of procurement, but far fewer once the system has been integrated into public-service operations.

A market of this kind needs some institutional support for continuity. Public buyers can aggregate demand, use common contractual expectations and recognize shared technical evidence. Continuity would then become a feature that vendors can offer and price. Smaller firms could compete for parts of the service relationship without forcing an incumbent to disclose every proprietary asset. The point is to keep a workable route open while vendors protect the engineering and services that give their products value.

Several familiar tools can help. An open interface may permit substitution at one carefully chosen point. Data rights or escrow can preserve a transition route when the mission justifies the cost. Open-source platforms may reduce dependence on a single software owner, yet they leave unresolved questions about integration, security updates, certification and liability. Each tool serves a particular purpose. Lifecycle trust provides a reason for choosing among these tools and a standard for judging whether they work.

In practice, the answer will vary with the mission. Emergency response and critical infrastructure call for stronger continuity evidence than ordinary commercial use. Safety-critical flight software may remain under the original certification regime, with alternatives provided at the mission, data or service layer. Sometimes replacing a fleet will cost less and carry less risk than engineering a handover. The buyer should confront that choice before dependence becomes irreversible.

A Japan-Taiwan Demonstration

Japan and Taiwan offer a useful setting for testing this approach. In July 2026, Taiwanese manufacturer 7A Drones and Japanese operator AlterSky agreed to cooperate on large cargo drones. Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs described plans for field demonstrations, regulatory certification support and commercial applications in Japan. The partnership combines 7A Drones' aircraft systems with AlterSky's operational experience, including disaster response. This industrial cooperation provides an opportunity to examine continuity before public agencies commit to using the systems. Participants could ask whether a cargo drone used for an essential public service could continue its mission within an acceptable time and cost if one supplier became unavailable.

A limited pre-procurement demonstration could test one mission and one continuity path. Japanese and Taiwanese participants would document the recovery time, the legal approvals required, safety findings and added cost. The purpose would be to learn which dependencies matter before a larger public commitment is made. The exercise would test whether accountable officials could still carry out the mission without the original supplier and identify any missing permissions, support arrangements or resources. A failed test would give them a reason to revise the arrangement before relying on it in service. The demonstration would reveal the gap while public agencies still have time to change the arrangement.

Waiting until a disaster would allow a manageable dependency to become a post-sale sovereignty crisis.

(This piece reflects the author's opinion, and does not represent the opinion of CommonWealth Magazine.)

CommonWealth Magazine welcomes op-ed submissions. Please send your article proposals to [email protected]

About the Author:

Minn-Tsong Lin is a Distinguished Professor of Physics at National Taiwan University and a jointly appointed Research Fellow at Academia Sinica. A Fellow of the American Physical Society and Associate Editor of Applied Physics Letters, his research spans spintronics, nanomagnetism, surface magnetism, and nanomaterials. He also co-chairs the German-Taiwanese Dialogue Platform (GTDP) and is the founder and chair of the Taiwan Sustainability Hub (TSH).

Have you read?

• Taiwan’s Resilience Procurement Is Measuring the Wrong Output
• China Treats AI as Comprehensive Strategy and That Makes a Big Difference
• Taiwan's Drone Problem Is Replenishment, Not Production

Uploaded by Ian Huang