After a full year of anxiety and uncertainty, Taiwan’s carnival-like presidential campaign has finally come to end. Incumbent Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won re-election on Jan. 11 by garnering a record 8.17 million votes, defeating her main opponent by 19.5 percentage points.

“With each presidential election, Taiwan is showing the world how much we cherish our free, democratic way of life, and how much we cherish our nation: the Republic of China (Taiwan),” Tsai said at an international press conference on election night after her victory was confirmed. 

She said her triumph also represented a rejection of the “one-country, two-systems” model China has imposed on Hong Kong and has proposed using for Taiwan. 

In a victory speech at party headquarters shortly after that, she told her supporters: “The Republic of China Taiwan, this brave and beautiful country, how could you not be willing to want to see more of it? Being able to lead a country like this is a great honor for me.”

                               

Reversal of Fortune  

The DPP was able to win back the trust of the people barely a year after suffering a major defeat in nationwide elections for local offices in late November 2018 by focusing its message on the threat China posed to the country.

The 2020 election reflected voters’ view of the world and Taiwan’s position in it, as the majority sided with Tsai’s U.S.-oriented approach rather than a China-leaning policy. The DPP’s intensive use of the “anti-China” card, however, could lead to unpredictable consequences for Taiwan’s relations with China in the future.

“Taiwan’s elections are always about issues at three levels – U.S.- China relations, cross-Taiwan Strait relations, and Taiwan’s internal battle over unification vs. independence,” observes Hung Yao-nan, president of the Taiwan Asian Network for Free Elections. 

Hung argued that if the U.S.-China framework is stable, then attention turns to relations with China. Prior to this election, however, U.S.-China relations showed signs of fraying and the Hong Kong protests had the effect of acting as a “showcase” and “setting an example.” Add to that the conflicting ideologies of unification and independence, and the combination ignited Taiwan’s internal generational contradictions, he says. 

Tsai’s Biggest Benefactors: Xi, Lam, Wu, Han

U.S.-China relations, cross-strait relations, and Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protests triggered major unease within Taiwan over the unification/independence fault line and brought to the surface the cleavages between generations, deepening generational confrontation. These factors all contributed to Tsai’s victory.

“China’s Xi Jinping, Hong Kong’s Carrie Lam and the KMT’s [chairman] Wu Den-yih and Han Kuo-yu were all Tsai’s benefactors,” says political pundit Clarence Wu (吳崑玉).    

Nathan F. Batto, an associate research fellow with the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, argues that at its core, Taiwan’s political environment remains founded on two questions: “What is Taiwan?” and “What kind of relationship should Taiwan have with China?”

“Identity and sovereignty are everything. Anything else is a secondary issue,” Batto says. 

Even if economic development is the priority, it still comes down to a choice between opening the Chinese market or maintaining a distance from the Chinese market and reaching out to the world, and “the approach you chose is related to your inner convictions,” Batto observes.

Tsai’s emergence from the depths of the election defeat of November 2018 is inextricably linked to her aggressive stance on cross-strait ties and its effect on her overall support rating. In CommonWealth Magazine’s State of the Nation Survey conducted at the end of 2018, only 19.95 percent of respondents said they were satisfied with Tsai’s performance, compared with 78.07% who were dissatisfied. But in the same survey at the end of 2019, Tsai’s satisfaction rating was up to 48.13 percent and exceeded dissatisfaction (which was 47.52%) for the first time in the four surveys conducted during her presidency.

Attacking ‘One Country, Two Systems’

The November 2018 elections represented a backlash of grassroots conservatism and the galvanization of groups opposed to several issues, such as political factionalism and same-sex marriage.

That political atmosphere changed dramatically in 2019, starting with Xi Jinping’s speech on Jan. 2, 2019 directed at Taiwan in which he proposed the “one country, two systems” model for realizing “national reunification.”

“This was the first time since the two sides developed the ‘1992 consensus’ that a Chinese leader gave it meaning as a direction for the future,” an observer says, referring to Xi’s mention of “one country, two systems.”  

That gave Tsai an opportunity to exploit society’s antipathy to the model used for Hong Kong and Macau to discredit the “1992 consensus” by making the two formulas interchangeable, which hurt the KMT’s more conciliatory approach to China based on the “1992 consensus.”

KMT says the consensus is a tacit understanding reached in 1992 between Taiwan and China under which both sides acknowledge there is only “one China,” with each free to interpret what “China” means, and it was used as the basis for interaction between Taiwan and China from 2008 to 2016 when the KMT was in power. The DPP has never accepted its existence or its premise – that Taiwan is part of “one China.”

Tsai’s rhetoric was given a boost by the Hong Kong democracy protests, which at their core opposed China’s erosion of its autonomy and failure to live up to its “one country, two systems” commitment. The protests further fueled the emphasis on Taiwan’s sovereignty and opposition to “one country, two systems” and the “1992 consensus.” 

“The Hong Kong protests basically showed Taiwan’s younger generation the result of a ‘one country, two systems’ model” said Michelle Wu, the former head of National Taiwan University’s student association, in describing the anxiety felt by Taiwanese youth.

After Xi announced the “one country, two systems” plan, younger Taiwanese began feeling more acutely the Chinese Communist Party’s desire for “unification,” sensing that Taiwan was being gradually devoured by China much like the frog in the boiling frog fable. “It’s like Hong Kong – a decision made 30 years ago now has to be shouldered 30 years later by young people who have no decision-making power,” Wu says.

Photo by Kuo-Tai Liu/CW

Xi Jinping’s speech, the Hong Kong protests and the case in October of a self-described Chinese spy seeking asylum in Australia who said China was trying to interfere in Taiwan’s elections all formed a consistent thread that once again positioned the cross-strait issue as a major election battleground. The events both strengthened identification with Taiwan within the country and also weakened the voices of opposition that existed. 

“Everybody thought the threat from China was more important [than anything else]. The Communist Party helped Taiwan recognize what was most important,” says an advisor in the pan-green (pro-DPP) camp, citing the example of traditionally pan-green religious groups that split over the same-sex marriage issue in the November 2018 elections and referendums returning to the fold in 2020. 

The KMT, on the other hand, seemed unsure over what direction to take, squandering the momentum it had from its November 2018 victory. When asked why the pan-green camp’s manipulation of the “sense that the country is being destroyed” was so effective, one observer blamed KMT leadership for not having a clear enough vision of the future.

“Communist China could in fact pose a threat, but aside from the ‘1992 consensus’ the pan-blue camp was not able to propose a new argument and direction that put people at ease,” says Li Hou-ying, the founder of New Republic Report who was once part of the KMT’s Youth League.  

Both the pan-blue and pan-green camps tried to exploit the “dried mango” phenomenon (dried mango in Chinese – 芒果乾 – sounds like 亡國感, meaning a sense the country is being destroyed). 

The pan-blue camp said the pan-green camp was faking its embrace of the Republic of China (Taiwan’s official name). It also portrayed the Tsai government as moving toward authoritarianism and totalitarianism and deepening its use of its administrative power to sew social divisions, citing the DPP’s rapid passage of the Anti-infiltration Act and Tsai campaign spokeswoman Lin Ching-yi’s comment in an interview that advocating unification with China is treason.

But Tsai had already exploited the protests in Hong Kong to assume the mantle of “guardian” of the “Republic of China Taiwan,” and her rhetoric promising to “protect Taiwan’s free and democratic lifestyle” and asserting that “I’m not the one changing the status quo” replaced predecessor Ma Ying-jeou’s positioning of Taiwan as the “protector of regional stability.”

“Tsai took a big step toward the middle, which squeezed Han Kuo-yu’s space for survival,” says Michael You, the head of the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation.

Young Voters Carry the Day

As Taiwan entered the 21^st century, the country’s political environment was dominated by the blue-green divide. Twenty years later, however, the 2020 election saw the emergence of a generation gap that could not be ignored.

Though the KMT ran a poor campaign, it was relatively united by election day. 

“Blue camp supporters eventually returned to the fold because the DPP’s governance was a real failure. Everything Tsai Ing-wen did outraged blue voters, and the two candidates’ positions on cross-strait relations were quite different,” says Cheng Li-wen, who won a seat as a KMT legislator-at-large in the election.

Yet, the phenomenon of supporters returning to their respective loyalties was mostly evident among voters 45 and over, who are considered to be roughly evenly divided between pan-blue and pan-green backers. That left younger voters and independent voters to decide the election’s outcome.

Han’s announcement of his willingness to run for presidency soon after being elected Kaohsiung mayor hurt him with those segments of the electorate.

“The expectations of young people and unaffiliated voters for Han Kuo-yu were too high, but Han did not handle those expectations well. His image was also controversial,” says a blue-camp legislator who spoke on condition of anonymity. Hna’s fortunes were made worse by the fact that while Han fans were extremely cohesive, they also tended to exclude others.

“In the past, supporter passion could drive a candidate’s momentum and create a ripple effect that widened the support base, but this time it had an adverse effect,” the lawmaker says.

While the green camp mobilized young people to return to their hometowns to vote (Taiwan does not have absentee ballots so voters have to return to where they are registered to cast their ballot), the blue camp was consolidating its support among middle-aged and older generations, in effect ignoring younger voters.

That proved unwise, says Hung of the Taiwan Asian Network for Free Elections, because “Taiwanese politics have entered an era when generational issues supersede the blue-green dichotomy.” 

The emergence of National Taiwan University Hospital physician Ko Wen-je into the political fray following the 2014 Sunflower Movement signaled the surfacing of Taiwan’s generational chasms. 

That’s why Tsai addressed generational issues such as same-sex marriage, pension cuts and the implementation of the 40-hour work week after taking office in 2016. The dissatisfaction triggered by the process led to a strong backlash from conservative forces that proved decisive in the November 2018 elections.

When Han ran for Kaohsiung mayor in 2018, the slogans that resonated with voters and shot him to victory were that Kaohsiung was old and poor and that youth in southern Taiwan were being forced to go north to find work.

“He saw where the problems were, that young people did not have opportunities or a future. But he did not follow up with solutions, and then came the Hong Kong protests,” Hung says.

In contrast, after the same-sex marriage bill passed the Legislature in May 2019, Tsai’s situation took a dramatic turn for the better, and her government’s policy proposals, including lower taxes and allowances for infants, won over younger voters. 

Photo by Chien-Ying Chiu/CW

Yet the government still faced opposition from older generations, as Han supporters coalesced around their collective identities, memories and values. They embraced the Republic of China flag as their main symbol, sang nostalgic songs like the old military tune “Night Raid,” and maintained faith in the Republic of China’s historical, cultural and traditional values. 

Photo by Kuo-Tai Liu/CW

As the chasm between generations grew bigger, the Tsai government did not confront it or try to solve it, leading to a head-on collision between people of different age groups. This election demonstrated, however, that winning the support of the younger generation is the key to winning the future. 

Tsai’s Biggest Challenges Still to Come

The “assists” from the U.S. and China, the symbolism of the Hong Kong protest movement and the politicization of the younger generation converged into a powerful whirlpool that helped Tsai win re-election. That does not guarantee smooth sailing over the next four years, however; in fact, her road may get considerably bumpier.

First, the Tsai government could come under pressure from both the U.S. and China. Many observers saw Taiwan’s election as a “proxy” battle between the two powers.

But as National Sun Yat-sen University Institute of Political Science professor Frank Liu wondered: Does Tsai really want to be seen as America’s “proxy”? Will Beijing really want to give her face?

The situation could grow increasingly deadlocked, leaving the Taiwan issue without a solution, Liu contended.

The KMT’s Cheng Li-wen argues that “Tsai Ing-wen will quickly become a lame duck in her second term.”

Cheng does not believe society supported Tsai’s re-election because she governed well and wonders what will happen when she faces tricky issues.

The U.S. could come calling in the near future demanding that Taiwan lift its longstanding ban on imported pork containing trace amounts of ractopamine, a highly contentious issue within Taiwan, which bans the use of the feed additive. Tsai may also face pressure from Japan to buy food items from areas potentially still contaminated with radioactive substances from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant meltdown in 2011. Both of those issues could lead to major political rifts.

They also symbolize the potential for Tsai to be constrained by the international situation during her second term.

Domestically, the battle among the DPP’s internal factions could erupt over new political appointments, first for legislative speaker, then for premier (although incumbent Premier Su Tseng-chang has been asked to stay on). The Examination Yuan and Control Yuan are also expected to change their leaders this year. The positions are appointed by the president, but the power of different factions in the Legislature will surely affect how they are apportioned.

Perhaps even more important is how President Tsai will try to mend the fissures between different generations and the blue and green camps. If any conclusion can be drawn from the election results, it may be that the national identity of the people living in Taiwan is becoming increasingly clear. There appears to be a growing consensus for identification with the idea that Taiwan is the Republic of China and the Republic of China is Taiwan.

But the large number of people who voted for Han Kuo-yu indicates there remains strong skepticism among a large bloc of voters over Tsai’s governance, to the point of causing rifts among families and friends. When Tsai says Taiwan needs to be united if it wants to be strong, she will have to take tangible action to embrace dissent and show that the president of the Republic of China is not just the president of DPP supporters, but the president of all of Taiwan’s 23 million people. 

Translated by Luke Sabatier
Edited by Sharon Tseng